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Bergson’s Theory of Free Will 
  
Joel Dolbeault 
University of Lille III 
In short, contingency and freedom, it all means creation; freedom for us is 
creation. 
—Henri Bergson, L’évolution du problème de la liberté,  
Cours au Collège de France 1904–1905 
 
The Bergsonian conception of free will is rarely discussed in the current 
debate. However, this conception is of real interest because Bergson develops 
an original form of indeterminism, capable of avoiding the main objection 
addressed to classical indeterminism: the objection of chance. For classical 
indeterminism, freedom of will implies a choice between several possible 
futures, traditionally called “alternative possibilities,” and this point is 
targeted by the objection of chance. In contrast, for Bergson, freedom of will 
essentially implies inventing a future by forming an idea of action. It is not 
reduced to a choice between preset alternatives, and its dimension of 
invention, of creation, is enough to found indeterminism. The aim of this 
article is, therefore, to present the Bergsonian theory of free will and to show 
its relevance to the current debate. 
Some recent publications have started to draw attention to the 
Bergsonian approach to free will.1 However, these analyses need to be further 
developed on several points: the criticism of alternative possibilities, the 
defense of an original form of agent causation, and the fact that Bergson 
discusses free will regardless of the question of moral responsibility. In 
addition, it is important to shed light on a crucial question related to the 
Bergsonian approach: the question of causation. While it is true that Bergson 
rejects the notion of mechanical causation to understand free will, he 
nevertheless uses a certain notion of causation. We must therefore clarify this 
concept and show that it does not imply determinism. 
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Bergson developed his ideas on free will in his first book: Time and Free 
Will (1889). While most of what I will say relates to this book, Bergson brings 
some complementary elements to his theory throughout his work. In the first 
part of the article, I will explain how Bergson conceives of determinism and 
why he rejects this position. In the second part, I will explain how he conceives 
of classical indeterminism, based on the notion of alternative futures, and why 
he also rejects this position. Finally, in the third part, I will attempt to show 
that Bergson defends an original form of indeterminism based on a new 
approach to causation. 
The Criticism of Determinism 
The Incompatibility between Free Will and Determinism 
In Time and Free Will, Bergson tackles the question of free will without 
starting from a precise definition of this notion, probably because starting 
from a precise definition would amount to presupposing too many things.2 
However, he still presupposes two things: first, free will concerns the actions 
of a subject, of a self;3 secondly, there is an opposition between freedom and 
necessity.4 
The first presupposition is shared by all philosophers who are interested 
in free will. However, in Bergson, this presupposition is reflected in his 
vocabulary: Bergson speaks much more often of “free act” than of “free will,”5 
even if the question he addresses is essentially that of free will (in the words 
of the contemporary debate). This choice of vocabulary is not trivial. It can be 
explained by the idea that, as will is essentially turned towards action, it forms 
with action an overall process which must be considered as such.6 
The second presupposition is frequently discussed. A lot of philosophers, 
indeed, reject the opposition between freedom and necessity. However, in 
Bergson, this second presupposition is ultimately a mere hypothesis, because 
the entire analysis he proposes consists in proving that a freedom opposed to 
necessity is conceivable, that is to say, to take up the challenge set by 
philosophers who reject this opposition.7 In other words, his approach is not 
at all to start from a clear, conceptual opposition between freedom and 
necessity, and then to deduce various propositions. His approach instead is 
to start from an intuitive opposition between freedom and necessity, then to 
show that this intuitive opposition can be translated into a clear conceptual 
opposition. 
The hypothesis of an opposition between freedom and necessity 
corresponds to the hypothesis of an incompatibility between freedom and 
determinism. In the terms of contemporary debates, this is therefore an 
incompatibilist hypothesis. However, to fully understand this hypothesis, it 
is important to understand how Bergson characterizes determinism. 
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Bergson distinguishes two kinds of determinism: physical determinism 
and psychological determinism. Physical determinism is the idea that all 
physical phenomena are governed by laws.8 This determinism concerns the 
question of free will provided that we add a hypothesis that reduces psychic 
life to cerebral life.9 Psychological determinism is formed on the model of 
physical determinism. It conceives of the self as a set of distinct states whose 
evolution is governed by laws.10 For the two determinisms, the notion of law 
is therefore central because laws are conceived as the foundation of necessity. 
From this point of view, determinism says something more than the principle 
of universal causation (PUC): 
The PUC: 
Every phenomenon is determined by a cause. 
 
Determinism: 
Every phenomenon is determined by a cause whose action obeys laws. 
 
Consequently: 
Every phenomenon is determined by a cause before it even occurs. 
From the point of view of the PUC, a phenomenon may have a cause 
whose action does not obey laws. In the third part of the article, we will see 
that Bergson characterizes the free act in this way. In contrast, from the point 
of view of determinism, every phenomenon is determined by a cause whose 
action obeys laws. This implies that any phenomenon is determined before it 
occurs.11 In other words, the characteristics of a phenomenon are fully fixed 
before the phenomenon occurs. From this point of view, every phenomenon 
has a kind of virtual existence in its cause before having an actual existence, 
and causation is only the actualization of this virtual reality. 
That said, Bergson’s incompatibilist hypothesis consists in thinking that 
the concept of free will corresponds to the fact of creating the future, as 
opposed to the fact of actualizing an already fixed future. This appears in 
particular in the passage where he compares the free act to artistic creation:In 
short, we are free when our acts spring from our whole personality, when 
they express it, when they have that indefinable resemblance to it which one 
sometimes finds between the artist and his work.12According to this 
hypothesis, the free act is like artistic creation: it does not achieve a perfectly 
predefined plan, nor does it actualize a future mechanically predetermined 
by physical or psychological laws. It produces something that does not 
virtually preexist. 
In the books that follow Time and Free Will, Bergson repeatedly 
emphasizes this creative character of free will.13 Moreover, in his lectures at 
the Collège de France on freedom (1904‒1905), one passage is particularly 
clear on this point: 
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I summarize what I have just said: in short, contingency 
and freedom, it all means creation; freedom for us is 
creation. . . . We have already made this comparison, but 
we will come back to it often; freedom is a creation in the 
sense that one takes this word when one says that there is 
creation in a work of art. What do we mean by this? We do 
not mean that the work of art is an ex nihilo production, that 
it comes from nothing; by this we mean that, given the 
conditions which contributed to the production of the 
work, the work, if it is truly the work of an artist, adds to 
these conditions something absolutely new, absolutely 
unforeseeable.14 
Arguments against Determinism 
In Time and Free Will, Bergson puts forward several reasons for rejecting 
determinism in order to justify his incompatibilist hypothesis. First, he asserts 
that free will understood as a creation is given to consciousness as a fact; 
second, in response to physical determinism, he argues that there is no 
evidence that psychic life is reduced to cerebral life; third, in response to 
psychological determinism, he argues that the singularity of our deep-seated 
psychic states implies that they cannot be governed by laws. 
For Bergson, free will is given to our consciousness as a fact: “Freedom is 
therefore a fact, and among the facts which we observe there is none 
clearer.”15 In connection with the two presuppositions mentioned above, this 
fact presents two aspects: on the one hand, it appears that, at certain moments, 
our future depends on the plan of action which we form on the basis of our 
values;16 on the other hand, it appears that our future is only imperfectly 
prefigured by this plan because the latter depends on a self which is 
constantly evolving, and which can therefore be modified as long as the action 
is not completed.17 In this sense, the immediate intuition of our freedom is 
nothing other than the immediate intuition of our own duration in the realm 
of action. 
Despite this appearance, free will might be an illusion. However, from a 
methodological point of view, what is given to consciousness as a fact must 
be taken for real until it is shown to be an illusion. This is where the discussion 
with determinism comes into play. According to determinism, at any time, 
the psychic state of the self depends on what precedes and on the laws of 
nature. This amounts to saying that, at any time, our psychic state is 
determined (fixed) before it occurs. 
For physical determinism, the determination in advance of our psychic 
states would be explained by the reduction of psychic life to cerebral life (the 
latter being conceived as governed by laws). In Time and Free Will, Bergson 
raises three objections to this hypothesis. First, the strict parallelism 
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(isomorphy) between psychic life and cerebral life is not proven. Certainly, 
any state of mind gives rise to a brain state. But that is not enough to prove 
parallelism because one can always imagine that several different psychic 
states give rise to the same cerebral state. Since psycho-physical parallelism 
has not been proved, neither has the reduction of the psychic activity to the 
cerebral one.18 The second element is that the law of conservation of energy 
does not allow us to prove this reduction because it has not been proved that 
this law applies to all physiological phenomena, in particular to cerebral 
phenomena.19 The third element is that the law of conservation of energy only 
applies to systems which, in absolute terms, are likely to return to one of their 
previous states. Now, it seems impossible that a being with a conscious life 
can go through the same state twice. In such a being, in fact, the past 
accumulates in memory and mixes with the present, thus making each 
present moment something new.20 We understand by this that physical 
determinism presupposes a conception of psychic life which neglects the 
action of duration. In this sense, it presupposes psychological determinism.21 
After Time and Free Will, Bergson develops the first two elements. In 
Matter and Memory, he attempts to show that there is no strict parallelism 
between pure memory (what we call today “episodic memory”) and the 
brain.22 In Creative Evolution and later Mind-Energy, he explains that the 
creation of a tiny amount of energy by a living being can have significant 
physical effects. To accomplish this aim, this energy has to be used to trigger 
a mechanism using a large amount of energy first extracted from the 
environment.23 
For psychological determinism, the determination in advance of our 
psychic states would be explained by psychological laws. Against this idea, 
Bergson presents an argument based on the continuity of psychological life. 
This argument can be summarized as follows: 
(i) Our deep-seated psychic states bear the mark of the time 
that has elapsed: they are formed by the whole of our 
memory. 
(ii) Therefore, our deep-seated psychic states are singular. 
(iii) However, a law can only govern instances of 
universals. 
(iv) Consequently, the evolution of our deep-seated states 
is not governed by laws.24 
Our deep-seated psychic states are our most intimate feelings, thoughts 
and aspirations.25 They make our personality and tend to direct our life, that 
is to say to determine our will at certain crucial moments. According to 
Bergson, these deep-seated psychic states are formed by the whole of our 
memory in the sense that they are the synthesis of all of our past experiences. 
For example, the feeling of love that we may have for a person at a given time 
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is formed by all of our past history with that person and, more generally, by 
all of our past relationships with other people. 
Point (ii) is the consequence of point (i). As our past experiences are 
singular,26 the deep-seated psychic states formed from them are also singular. 
Furthermore, as our past experiences accumulate over time, our deep-seated 
psychic states are constantly evolving, if only imperceptibly. In other words, 
these states are never repeated over time. 
Point (iii) introduces an indisputable idea: a law is a certain relation 
between universals; therefore, it can only govern instances of universals. To 
better understand this, one can make a comparison with physics. If some laws 
seem to govern physical processes, it is because these systems seem to be 
reduced to a set of typical qualities (mass, electric charge, position, speed, and 
so forth) which differ only in quantity. In the field of psychology, the situation 
looks different. 
Point (iv) is the logical consequence of points (ii) and (iii). If our deep-
seated psychic states are singular, their evolution cannot be governed by laws. 
According to Bergson, the mistake of psychological determinism is that 
it is based on an associationist view of the mind. Basically, associationism 
conceives of the mind as a set of tendencies without singularity, governed by 
laws of force.27 In so doing, psychological determinism is deceived by the 
language which designates our tendencies by general and impersonal terms: 
“love,” “hate,” and so forth. In reality, due to the continuity of psychological 
life, “each of us has his own way of loving and hating; and this love or this 
hatred reflects his whole personality.”28 
The Criticism of Classical Indeterminism 
The Paradox of Free Will in Classical Indeterminism 
Bergson rejects determinism, but he also rejects a certain form of 
indeterminism. As this form generally corresponds to the position of those 
who defend indeterminism,29 I will speak of it as classical indeterminism. 
Classical indeterminism considers that the following fact is given to 
consciousness: “when we perform an action freely, some other action would 
have been ‘equally possible.’”30 Moreover, in classical indeterminism this fact 
is understood as follows: imagine that at some moment O, I decide to perform 
an act X; this decision is free if and only if, at this same moment O, and without 
any modification of the world or of myself, I can decide to perform an act Y 
(different from X).31 Therefore, from this point of view, a free decision does 
not entirely depend on what precedes it.32 
Bergson explains classical indeterminism using a diagram. This diagram 
represents a self which traverses a series of psychic states MO, then finds itself 
before two future directions OX and OY, equally open, as in the figure below. 
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The fact that OX and OY are two equally open directions implies that the 









F i g .  1  S c h e m a t i c  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  f r e e  a c t  
f o r  c l a s s i c a l  i n d e t e r m i n i s m  ( B e r g s o n ,  T i m e  a n d  
F r e e  W i l l ,  1 7 6 ) .  
Bergson presents this form of indeterminism without referring to any 
specific philosopher defending this view.33 However, it is likely that he is 
thinking of Descartes. Two elements justify this interpretation. First, this form 
of indeterminism corresponds fairly well with Descartes’s position, whose 
central point is that our will is totally independent of our passions and 
knowledge—a total independence which allows us to make a decision against 
our passions and/or our reason.34 Secondly, in his lectures at the Collège de 
France on freedom, Bergson underlines the fact that Descartes defends a form 
of indeterminism the consequence of which is to make the human will similar 
to the divine will: as radically independent from all determination.35 
Bergson may also be thinking of Kant who also defends the central idea 
of classical indeterminism: an action is freely performed if the agent can also 
choose not to perform this action.36 For Kant, as for Descartes, a free action is 
radically independent from all determination. What is original in Kant is that 
free action emanates from a will clearly conceived as intelligible, that is, 
outside of space and time.37 
Finally, it should be noted that classical indeterminism is the most 
frequently defended form of indeterminism today in philosophy. For 
contemporary indeterminist thinkers, indeed, free will implies a choice 
between alternative futures, called “alternative possibilities,” and in some 
authors we find a diagram very similar to the one made by Bergson.38 
Moreover, free will implies a choice independent of any determination. In this 
sense, these thinkers assert that an agent can make a decision without any 
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rational preference39 or against her rational preference.40 From this point of 
view, the choice between alternatives is not determined by a reason (nor by 
anything else), even if each alternative has its own reasons. 
In contrast with determinism, classical indeterminism asserts that, at 
certain times, several futures are possible for an agent. However, according to 
Bergson, this indeterminism yields several paradoxes. A first paradox 
concerns the free act: if the free act implies a choice independent of all 
determination, it implies a kind of indifference41—the most striking 
manifestation of this indifference being the capacity to choose against one’s 
rational preference. A second paradox concerns the self: if the free act comes 
from the self, and if it implies a choice independent of all determination, then 
the self itself must be conceived as independent of all determination, that is to 
say without any quality.42 
As such, this conception is not incompatible with the two elements 
presupposed by Bergson: first, free will concerns the actions of a self; 
secondly, there is an opposition between freedom and necessity. However, it 
leads us to conceive of the free act and the self in a counterintuitive way. 
Arguments against Classical Indeterminism 
Bergson rejects classical indeterminism for two reasons. The first reason 
is that it develops a conception of the free act which does not correspond with 
experience. 
Classical indeterminism asserts that alternative possibilities are a fact 
given to consciousness.43 However, for Bergson, this fact is illusory. What is 
given to consciousness is not the ability to choose between already defined 
ideas of action, corresponding to already fixed futures,44 but the ability to 
invent ideas of action and to change our mind, even when we have already 
made a decision.45 In other words, what is given to consciousness is not the 
ability to choose between already fixed futures, but the ability to invent our 
own future. 
The experience of free will according to classical indeterminism: 
At certain times, I choose between several possible futures (already fixed). 
 
The experience of free will according to Bergson: 
At certain times, I invent my future by forming an idea of action. 
Bergson adds that an illusion can explain why so many philosophers 
conceive of free will as implying alternative possibilities. The starting point is 
that our intelligence46 finds it difficult to conceive of the process of forming a 
will because this process relates to something that is always changing: ideas 
of action that appear, that gradually become more precise, that change more 
or less, etc. As a result, we spontaneously create a simplified and symbolic 
representation of this process, as if it related to something fixed: two or three 
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ideas immediately and completely defined between which the self would 
oscillate. In doing so, we do not take into account the inventive effort of the 
self and equate reflection with a mechanical oscillation. Furthermore, since 
we consider ideas as immediately and completely defined, we assimilate 
these ideas to virtual future actions waiting for an actualization, such as 
actions X and Y in the figure above.47 In this way, we fix and spatialize 
psychological duration.48 For Bergson, this diagram is therefore not trivial: 
consciously or unconsciously, it corresponds to the way in which our intellect 
symbolizes the process of forming a will through a spatial image.49 The 
problem is that this image is misleading for philosophy because it tends to 
mask the inventive capacity of the self, that is to say the essence of freedom. 
The second reason to reject classical indeterminism is that it develops a 
conception of the self which does not correspond with experience. In classical 
indeterminism, the self must be independent of all determination. It can 
therefore be conceived of in two ways: either as an invariable reality in time 
(that is to say as a permanent substrate of the successive psychic states); or, 
more radically, as a reality out of time. The first version corresponds to the 
Cartesian self; the second version to the Kantian self as a thing-in-itself. 
However, neither the self as an invariable reality, nor the self as a reality out 
of time is given in experience. What is given in experience is a constantly 
changing self, both in life in general and during the process of forming a 
will.50 
Some may respond that the concept of the self as an invariable reality is 
justified in another way, when it comes to accounting for the unity of the self 
through time. In this case, the invariable self can be thought of as what allows 
the successive psychic states to be linked. However, according to Bergson, this 
concept is based on an error which consists in conceiving of psychological life 
as discontinuous, that is, as a succession of distinct states.51 In reality, each 
present psychic state is more or less penetrated by memories, and the unity of 
the self through time corresponds to the permanent penetration of its past into 
its present. 
Another difficulty concerns the relation of this undetermined self to its 
reasons: on the one hand, indeterminist philosophers acknowledge that 
reasons do play a role in free decision; on the other hand, they claim that free 
decision is independent of all determination. But it is difficult to understand 
how to reconcile these two assertions.52 
Finally, for Bergson, classical indeterminism differs little from 
determinism in the way it represents psychological life. Both neglect 
psychological duration, that is, psychological continuity. Likewise, both have 
a purely symbolic view of the process of forming a will, which relates to fixed 
ideas of action that are comparable to spatial directions.53 Consequently, both 
neglect the creative nature of freedom: 
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That is why, in spite of all their efforts, [most philosophers] 
cannot succeed in conceiving the radically new and 
unforeseeable. I speak not only of those philosophers who 
believe in so rigorous a concatenation of phenomena and 
events that effects must be deduced from causes: such 
philosophers imagine that the future is given in the present, 
that it is theoretically visible in it, that to the present it will 
add nothing new. But even those few who have believed in 
free will, have reduced it to a simple “choice” between two 
or more alternatives, as if these alternatives were 
“possibles” outlined beforehand, and as if the will was 
limited to “bringing about” (“realiser”) one of them. They 
therefore still admit even if they do not realize it, that 
everything is given. They seem to have no idea whatever of 
an act which might be entirely new (at least inwardly) and 
which in no way would exist, not even in the form of the 
purely possible, prior to its realization. But this is the very 
nature of a free act.54 
The only difference between the two positions is that classical 
indeterminism invokes a self without determination, able to choose any of 
these directions, whereas determinism does not invoke this self and concludes 
that, in each situation, only one direction is really possible. However, classical 
indeterminism seems much less robust than determinism.55 
An Original Form of Indeterminism 
The Free Act 
As I said at the outset of the article, Bergson presupposes two things: first, 
free will concerns the actions of a self; second, there is an opposition between 
freedom and necessity. Classical indeterminism seeks to reconcile these two 
points by asserting that the free act emanates from a self who is independent 
of all determination. The problem is that this self does not correspond with 
any experience. The solution proposed by Bergson is quite different. It 
consists in affirming that the free act emanates from “the whole of the self,”56 
“the whole soul,”57 “our whole personality,”58 and that the self as a whole 
(i.e., with all its determinations) is singular. This singularity, indeed, ensures 
that its activity cannot be governed by laws. 
More precisely, the free act always emanates from a state of the self which 
reflects the whole of the self,59 due to the penetration of our memory in this 
state. In this sense, Bergson writes that some of our states agree “with the 
whole of our most intimate feelings, thoughts and aspirations, with that 
particular conception of life which is the equivalent of all our past 
experience.”60 In terms of the contemporary debate, we can see that, for 
Bergson, the free act requires an event causation which is also an agent 
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causation. On the one hand, every act (free or not) emanates from a certain 
state of the self, and therefore requires an event causation. But on the other 
hand, the free act emanates from a specific state of the self: a state which 
reflects the whole of the self. Therefore, it also requires an agent causation. In 
this sense, the free act combines the two causations, which are not opposed. 
In contemporary libertarianism, their opposition comes from the failure to 
take into account the psychological continuity which allows an agent to be 
entirely in one of its states.61 
Insofar as the free act comes from the self as a whole, we can see that 
freedom is not to be sought in indifference.62 On the contrary, it is to be sought 
in the maximum commitment of the self in a state. From this point of view, 
Bergson anticipates the so-called objections to human freedom based on Libet 
type experiences. Basically, since these experiences relate to indifferent acts 
(probably in reference to classical indeterminism), they do not relate to 
freedom at all.63 
Insofar as the free act comes from the self as a whole, we can also see that 
freedom admits of degrees.64 These degrees correspond to the fact that the self 
can be more or less engaged in each of its states. The lowest degree 
corresponds to acts performed almost automatically because these acts 
depend on a small part of our mind that has become independent from the 
whole. Let us think in particular of acts performed out of habit,65 or certain 
impulsive acts.66 The highest degree corresponds to the acts which depend on 
the whole of our mind, that is to say, which express our global conception of 
life.67 And between the two, there are acts which depend on a set of ideas and 
feelings that are more or less well merged with the rest of our mind, for 
example, certain ideas inherited from our education but more or less 
consistent with the rest of our ideas.68 
Does Bergson Define the Free Act? 
On the one hand, Bergson proposes several formulae which look like 
definitions of the free act: 
It is the whole soul, in fact, which gives rise to the free 
decision: and the act will be so much the freer the more 
dynamic series with which it is connected tends to be the 
fundamental self.69 
 
In short, we are free when our acts spring from our whole 
personality.70 
But on the other hand, he asserts that freedom is not definable, and that 
any attempt to define it will ensure the victory of determinism.71 How should 
we understand this? 
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In fact, the question is twofold. First, are the formulae proposed by 
Bergson definitions of the free act? Secondly, can these formulae actually 
work in favor of determinism? 
The answer to the first question depends on what is meant by the word 
“define.” If defining an object consists in characterizing this object in general, 
then the formulae proposed by Bergson are indeed definitions of the free act. 
However, in Time and Free Will, Bergson gives a limited meaning to the word 
“define.” For him, defining an object consists in analyzing this object,72 that is 
to say in reducing it to elements that are already known.73  From this point of 
view, the formulae proposed by Bergson are not definitions of the free act 
because they seek to say what the free act is without employing the already 
known notions of everyday or philosophical language. In these formulae, 
Bergson introduces a series of new expressions aimed at designating the self 
while taking into account psychological continuity: “the whole of the self,” 
“the whole soul,” “our whole personality.” Moreover, these formulae evoke 
the idea of causation but without using the terms “cause” or “causation,” 
probably because too many misleading meanings are attached to these terms 
in the philosophical tradition. This is why Bergson uses metaphorical 
expressions: the whole soul “gives rise” to the free decision;74 free acts 
“spring” from our whole personality.75 
The answer to the second question is that, for Bergson, only the analytic 
definitions of the free act ensure the victory of determinism. This explains 
why Bergson essentially criticizes these definitions, not his own formulae. 
Three definitions are targeted in particular, which are based respectively on 
the concepts of possibility, forecasting, and necessity.76 These three 
definitions evoke a mysterious contingency which it is difficult not to 
assimilate with chance. We understand then that they can work in favor of 
determinism. 
In the terminology of The Creative Mind,77 the analytic definitions of the 
free act use notions already stored in our language to obtain an immediate 
clarity. However, as these notions are somewhat confusing, the question of 
free will is ultimately obscured. In contrast, the intuitive definitions proposed 
by Bergson are based on new notions, closer to the real data of consciousness. 
These notions may seem obscure at first sight, but their use aims to provide a 
new clarity concerning the question of free will. 
Free Will and Causation 
We have shown that the formulae proposed by Bergson to characterize 
the free act evoke the idea of causation, but without using this term. This can 
be explained by the fact that Bergson seeks to renew the notion of causation. 
In classical indeterminism, the rejection of determinism rests on the 
assumption that the self can be a cause acting independently of any 
determination. The problem is that the action of such a cause seems 
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indistinguishable from the action of chance: like the action of chance, under 
strictly identical conditions, this action can produce various effects, without 
any explanation. In this sense, a recurring criticism against classical 
indeterminism in contemporary debate is that it introduces an element of 
chance into free will.78 This element amounts to a rejection of the PUC. 
In contrast, in the indeterminism defended by Bergson, the rejection of 
determinism rests on the assumption that the self is singular. Such an 
assumption does not threaten the PUC in any way. However, it leads us to 
question the nature of causation. From this point of view, the third chapter of 
Time and Free Will, dedicated to free will, can be read as aiming to show that 
psychological causation is something other than mechanical causation. 
Certain passages of the book seem to contrast freedom and causation. 
Thus, at the beginning of chapter 3, Bergson evokes a will “capable of willing 
for willing’s sake,”79 as if this will could want without reason. He also 
mentions “effects which precede their causes,”80 as if free action could be an 
effect without cause. Some commentators have thus attempted to present 
Bergson’s position without using the notion of causation,81  or by bringing 
Bergson closer to classical indeterminism.82 However, in other passages, 
Bergson clearly states the need to develop a new conception of causation, 
opposed to determinism:83 
The determinist, however, led astray by a conception of 
duration and causality which we shall criticize a littler later, 
holds that the determination of conscious states by one 
another is absolute.84 
We shall not insist for the moment on this last point: we 
reserve the question in what sense the ego perceives itself 
as a determining cause.85 
Moreover, at the end of chapter 3, Bergson devotes a long analysis to the 
notion of causation to show that this notion is not opposed to that of 
freedom.86 According to him, all causation is basically the prefiguring of one 
phenomenon by another. But there are two kinds of prefiguring: the perfect 
prefiguring, thought on the model of mathematics, and the imperfect 
prefiguring, thought on the model of psychic life. According to the first 
model, an effect is prefigured in its cause as a theorem is prefigured in the 
definition of a geometric figure.87 Causation then resembles a deduction. It 
requires laws: given a type A state and a law “if A, then B,” then a type B state 
will necessarily occur. We can also say that, in this model, causation is only 
the actualization of a virtual reality: here, the actualization of the type B state 
whose virtual existence is based on the type A state and the law “if A, then 
B.” In contrast, according to the second model, an effect is prefigured in its 
cause as an action is prefigured in an idea.88 From this point of view, causation 
is not analogous to deduction. It appears as an effort to move from an idea to 
an action. This effort implies a progressive specification of the idea.89 For 
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example, if the idea is to go out for a walk, the effort consists in thinking of a 
series of actions (getting up, switching off certain electrical devices, taking a 
piece of clothing, etc.), then in using the sensorimotor representations making 
it possible to accomplish these actions. In more complex cases, which concern 
the question of free will, the initial idea is simply to answer a problem, and 
the effort consists in creating various ideas of action which we can compare, 
modify, and specify to have an action plan. So, in this model, causation has a 
creative dimension. It is no longer the actualization of a virtual reality, but the 
progressive formation of a new reality. In the terms of Mind-Energy, it is a 
“gradual passage from the less realized to the more realized, from the 
intensive to the extensive.”90 
According to Bergson, when it comes to understanding psychological 
life, the first model of causation is not necessary. There are three reasons for 
this: 
The first reason is that causation as creation seems to be given in 
experience. It is precisely the experience of freedom: 
On the one hand, we know force only through the witness 
of consciousness, and consciousness does not assert, does 
not even understand, the absolute determination, now, of 
actions that are still to come: that is all that experience 
teaches us, and if we hold by experience we should say that 
we feel ourselves free, that we perceive force, rightly or 
wrongly, as a free spontaneity.91 
The second reason is that the continuity of psychological life makes that 
the deep-seated psychic states are singular. It is therefore difficult to 
understand how their evolution could be governed by laws (see above). 
The third reason is that the mathematical model of causation is not a 
priori better than the psychological model. Admittedly, the mathematical 
model immediately meets the requirements of our intelligence which 
naturally tends to apprehend things in a geometric manner.92 However, this 
does not prove that this model can be applied to everything, in this case to 
psychological life. In addition, this model presents an intrinsic difficulty: since 
causation implies time, an effect is never really deduced from its cause. In 
other words, an effect is never logically necessary. It is, at best, metaphysically 
necessary.93 In this sense, the hypothesis of laws which would govern all or 
part of the processes is a metaphysical hypothesis, even if it is largely inspired 
by science. Basically, this hypothesis is a Platonism adapted to modern 
science: for Plato, there are universals (Ideas) which have a formative action 
on the physical world by being the condition of possibility of physical things 
and beings; in the hypothesis of laws, there are relations between universals 
(laws) which have a formative action on the physical world by governing the 
evolution of processes.94 According to Bergson, this Platonism as a global 
view of nature can be questioned.95 
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Free Will and Rationality 
The originality of the Bergsonian theory of free will can also be seen with 
regard to the relation between free will and rationality. 
For classical indeterminism, free decision comes from a self independent 
of its determinations. Therefore, this decision can be made without rational 
preference or against a rational preference––a position that we find today in 
contemporary indeterminism.96 In contrast, for Bergson, any free decision is 
rational. However, it is important to distinguish between two types of reason. 
On the one hand, Bergson rejects the idea that free decision is the result 
of a set of reasons quite distinct and easily expressible in everyday language. 
This would indeed amount to conceiving of psychological life in a mechanistic 
way, that is to say to adopt the view of psychological determinism.97 On the 
other hand, Bergson asserts that free decision is based on “our personal idea 
of happiness and honor,” which is “the best of reasons.”98 In other words, he 
asserts that the self, as a synthesis of ideas and feelings, plays as a unique 
reason in a free decision. From this point of view, there is no ambiguity, 
Bergson combines free will and rationality. After Time and Free Will, he 
emphasizes this point again: “But, in man, the thinking being, the free act may 
be termed a synthesis of feelings and ideas and the evolution which leads to 
it a reasonable evolution.”99 
Now, given that the reason for a free decision is singular, an agent may 
be unable to explain this reason to others, or even to itself. Consequently, its 
decision may seem irrational.100 This explains the surprising passages that 
were mentioned above. When Bergson evokes a will “capable of willing for 
willing’s sake,”101 he in fact evokes a will incapable of analyzing its own 
reason, that is to say, of reducing this reason to common and impersonal 
elements. Besides, in this same passage, he suggests that this will rests on a 
hidden, but “decisive reason.”102 Likewise, when Bergson refers to some 
“effects which precede their causes,”103 he is simply alluding to the fact that a 
free decision may occur before the agent finds an analytical expression of the 
reason for its decision. 
Free Will and Moral Responsibility 
In contemporary discussions, thinking about free will goes hand in hand 
with thinking about moral responsibility, as if these two notions were 
intimately linked. In trying to understand this connection, we first find the 
idea that moral responsibility is a sort of moral quality of agents which makes 
that the latter may deserve praise or blame for their actions. We also find the 
idea that moral responsibility would imply free will, because it appears as 
illegitimate to praise or blame an agent who would have acted without 
freedom. We finally find the idea that, because of this implication, moral 
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responsibility could help to understand free will: where there is moral 
responsibility, there would be free will. 
The Bergsonian approach to free will is very different: this approach 
completely ignores the notion of moral responsibility. There are two reasons 
for this. First, according to Bergson, the fundamental basis for understanding 
free will is the sui generis experience of free will, and not a notion belonging 
to our common or philosophical language (which may be misleading). 
Second, because of this experience, the question of free will appears to be a 
metaphysical question with no specific relation to the concept of moral 
responsibility. For Bergson, the question of free will is this: am I the creator of 
my future, or is this future already determined? It is not at all obvious that the 
notion of moral responsibility can shed light on this question. Moreover, in 
contemporary discussions, there are several conceptions of moral 
responsibility, some compatible with determinism, others not. Therefore, this 
notion is more likely to obscure the question of free will than to clarify it. 
Another problem arises. In contemporary discussions on free will, moral 
responsibility is often thought without regard for any usefulness.104  
However, being accountable to someone, and deserving of praise or blame, 
intuitively seems to have a purpose: to encourage agents to behave according 
to certain rules. Therefore, moral responsibility appears as something aimed 
at exerting a certain pressure on agents. The problem is that, for Bergson, free 
decision comes from ourselves, not from outside pressure. In Bergsonian 
terms, this decision emanates from the fundamental self, not from the social 
self.105 Therefore, there seems to be a tension between moral responsibility 
and free will, in the sense that the former can threaten the latter. 
Does this mean that Bergson conceives of human life without moral 
responsibility? The answer is negative because we are also social beings who 
have duties towards others. However, this point does not remove the tension 
between moral responsibility and free will. 
Does this mean that, for Bergson, free will is on the side of selfishness? 
There too, the answer is negative because, for him, human beings have a 
natural capacity for love, which may wake up in contact with exceptional 
moral personalities.106 In this case, it is the fundamental self that is moral, that 
is, the self from which the free acts emanate. 
 
Conclusion 
Bergson defends an original form of indeterminism: an indeterminism 
without the notion of alternative possibilities. The basis of this originality is a 
certain conception of causation: in the free act, causation must not be 
conceived as the actualization of a pre-fixed virtual reality, but as the 
progressive formation of a reality which is not pre-fixed. Thanks to this 
conception, Bergson can reject determinism without rejecting the principle of 
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universal causation. The indeterminism he defends therefore escapes the 
objection of chance, which is a recurring objection against indeterminism in 
the contemporary debate. 
After Time and Free Will, Bergson deepens and widens his research on free 
will. In Matter and Memory, he develops an additional argument against 
physical determinism, seeking to prove the independence of pure memory 
from the brain. In Creative Evolution, he seeks to show that the living world as 
a whole is creative, and that human freedom is not an anomaly in nature. 
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